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Business Method Patents and Patent Floods  
Michael J. Meurer* 
“[O]ne of the great inventions of our times, the diaper service 
[is not patentable].”1 
Giles S. Rich 
“We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to 
rest.”2  
Giles S. Rich 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The decline of the business method exception to patentability will 
increase the frequency of patent floods. By patent flood, I mean a 
dramatic jump in the number of patents filed covering a specific class 
of inventions, as we now observe in e-commerce.3 Floods are likely 
to become more frequent as future entrepreneurs respond to the 
appearance of a new market with a spate of business method patent 
applications claiming new methods tailored to the new market.  
A flood of related patents in a new market creates special 
problems for competition in addition to the usual problems that arise 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks for helpful 
comments to Wendy Gordon, Scott Kieff, Mark Lemley, Maureen O’Rourke, Arti Rai, and 
participants at the American Law and Economic Association (2000) meeting, the Boston 
University School of Law faculty workshop, and the conference on Intellectual Property Law, 
Digital Technology & Electronic Commerce at Washington University Law School. This 
Article was prepared for the 2001 Heart of America Intellectual Property Law Conference: 
“Intellectual Property, Digital Technology, and Electronic Commerce” co-sponsored by 
Washington University School of Law on April 6-7, 2001. 
 1. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 394 (1960). 
 2. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999) (extinguishing the business method exception in 
a decision that confirms a diaper service is not patentable). 
 3. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. 
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from market power associated with individual patents. Patent floods 
strain the resources of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
and adversely affect the quality of issued patents. Of particular 
concern, reduced patent quality increases uncertainty about the scope 
and validity of patents and increases the frequency of patent 
litigation. The fragility of the many start-ups in new markets makes 
them vulnerable to strategic patent litigation. The threat of patent 
litigation may deter entry or induce exit from the market. 
Furthermore, a thicket of patents may stultify development of 
technology because of the cost of securing patent licenses from the 
large numbers of patent owners. 
Cross-licensing agreements and patent pools can mitigate the 
problems caused by patent floods, but may sometimes cause 
difficulties of their own. The historical record shows that some 
successful pooling arrangements eliminated wasteful litigation and 
promoted technology development. Unfortunately, other pools 
fostered price-fixing agreements and other anti-competitive behavior. 
In some industries, patent floods did not stimulate patent owners to 
coordinate through cross-licensing or pooling. Innovation suffered as 
a result. 
Besides hoping that patent pools will mitigate problems caused by 
floods, we can take steps through patent law doctrine to reduce these 
problems. I argue that the PTO should use the subject matter and 
nonobviousness standards for patentability to limit grants of business 
method patents. My favored solution is reversal of State Street Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.4 and restoration of the 
business method exception. Short of reversal, I argue for a narrow 
reading of State Street and rigorous application of the 
nonobviousness standard.  
In Part II of this Article, I recount the story of the recent demise of 
the business method exception to patentability and categorize 
different business method patents. Some “method patents,” as defined 
by patent law, really protect product features. These ersatz “method 
patents” pose the greatest risk of patent floods and threat to 
competition. In Part III, I predict that as markets open in the future, 
 
 4. State St., 149 F.3d at 1368. 
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we will often see a flood of business method patents.5 In Part IV, I 
describe the problems that follow from a patent flood: low quality 
patents, increased litigation, exclusionary conduct, and delay of 
cumulative innovation. In Part V, I address the history of patent pools 
and cross-licensing agreements that emerged in response to previous 
patent floods as well as the benefits of pools compared to the risk that 
pools may facilitate cartelization or other antitrust problems. Finally, 
in Part VI, I discuss the patentable subject matter requirement6 and 
the nonboviousness standard7 in determining the validity of business 
method patents and regulating future patent floods. 
II. BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 
A. The Business Method Exception 
Section 101 of the Patent Act specifies that patentable subject 
matter includes “any new or useful process, . . . or any new and 
useful improvement thereof . . . .”8 Despite such broad language,9 
some processes have never been considered patentable subject 
matter. For example, purely mental processes are not patentable.10 
Additionally, the steps of a square dance or the process of calling the 
dance are not patentable.11 Until recently, the business method 
exception precluded patents on most business-related processes.12 
 
 5. Evidence for the prediction is the current flood of Internet related business method 
patents. 
 6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 7. Id. § 103. 
 8. Id. § 101. 
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) provides an unhelpful definition of process as a “process, art or 
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of 
matter, or material.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2001). 
 10. The square dance and square dance call are both copyrightable subject matter if they 
are original and fixed. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2001). 
 11. A patent granted on a method of gripping a golf putter. U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089 
(issued Apr. 1, 1997). 
 12. See Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent 
Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61 
(1999) (describing the ruling as a “sweeping . . . departure from precedent”). Despite the 
business method exception, there are examples of business method patents throughout the last 
century. See USPTO White Paper, Automated Financial or Management Data Processing 
Methods (Business Methods), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/index2.htm (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2001).  
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These classifications may stem from the failure of the courts to 
clearly state comprehensive principle for dividing patentable from 
unpatentable processes. One approach limits patents to industrial 
processes,13 while another approach limits patents to processes that 
manipulate artifacts or cause physical effects.14 A new standard, 
announced in State Street15 and AT&T v. Excel,16 expands patentable 
subject matter to include processes that produce a “useful, concrete 
and tangible result.”17 While the business method exception was 
compatible with the earlier and more narrow definitions of 
patentability, the new, expansive definition vitiates the exception. 
In State Street, State Street Bank sought a declaratory judgment of 
invalidity against Signature Financial’s patent for software used to 
administer a type of mutual fund.18 The patent claims described a 
computerized accounting system that calculated daily share values. 
The district court ruled in favor of State Street Bank, invalidating the 
invention,19 under the business method exception and the 
 
Automated financial/management business data processing method patents cannot 
trace their origins back to the founding of our nation. However, contrary to popular 
view, they did not suddenly spring into being in the late 1990s. On January 8, 1889, 
the era of automated financial/management business data processing method patents 
was born. United States patents 395,781; 395,782; and 395,783 were granted to 
inventor-entrepreneur Herman Hollerith on that date . . . . Mr. Hollerith’s method and 
apparatus patents automated the tabulating and compiling of statistical information for 
businesses and enterprises. They were acclaimed nationally and viewed as 
revolutionizing business data processing. The protection of his patents allowed his 
fledgling Tabulating Machine Company to succeed and thrive. In 1924, Thomas J. 
Watson, Sr. changed the company name to International Business Machine 
Corporation. Hollerith manual punch cards (IBM punch cards) and his methods for 
processing business data were still being used up until the birth of the personal 
computer era. 
Id. 
 13. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 
1143, 1178-85 (1999). 
 14. See id. at 1147, 1174; Ex parte Turner, 1894 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 36, 38. 
 15. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1997). 
 16. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 17. 149 F.3d at 1373; see also AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1361. 
 18. Specifically, a mutual fund with a hub-and-spoke structure is open only to other 
mutual funds. It is attractive because it holds tax advantages. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1370. 
 19. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 512-16 
(D. Mass. 1996).  
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mathematical algorithm exception.20  
On appellate renew, Judge Rich denounced the business method 
exception as unworkable in the PTO21 and not firmly grounded in any 
case law.22 Judge Rich was slightly more deferential toward the 
mathematical algorithm exception, which originated in Gottschalk v. 
Benson.23 In that case, the Supreme Court denied patent protection 
for computer software designed to convert one type of number into 
another type of number. The State Street district court believed 
Signature’s invention was governed squarely by Benson.24 Judge 
Rich disagreed; he argued that unlike software in Benson, Signature’s 
invention achieved a useful, concrete, and tangible result, so the 
mathematical algorithm exception did not apply.25 Essentially, 
Benson was distinguishable because Signature’s method manipulated 
numbers representing share value. 
The State Street decision set off a flood of e-commerce patents. 
The typical e-commerce patent has two distinguishing attributes: “(1) 
it describes an essentially commercial (as opposed to technological) 
activity, typically some way to make or save money; and (2) the 
hardware and software elements are described and claimed at such a 
high level of generality that they are for all practical purposes 
nominal.”26 A diverse number of business methods are now 
 
 20. Id. at 511. The Court stated that “the best clue to patentability [is] the mathematical 
algorithm/physical transformation test.” Id. The invention at issue was not patentable because it 
was “designed to manipulate and record numbers.” Id. at 514. 
 21. Judge Rich cited PTO guidelines stating, “Office personnel have had difficulty in 
properly treating claims directed to methods of doing business. Claims should not be 
categorized as methods of doing business. Instead such claims should be treated like any other 
process claim.” Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 
7479 (1996), cited in State St., 149 F.3d at 1377. 
 22. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375-76. 
 23. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). For a discussion of the mathematical algorithm exception, see 
generally Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for 
Algorithms and Other Computer-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L. REV. 1025 (1990). 
 24. See State St., 927 F. Supp. at 513-15. The district court judge was convinced that the 
reasoning in In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994), applied. In Schrader, the Federal 
Circuit found that the computer implemented method for bidding at an auction was 
unpatentable because it was a mathematical algorithm that did not give rise to any physical 
effect. Id. 
 25. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1373-74. 
 26. Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property 
Rights For Business Concepts And Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579-
80 n.5 (1999). 
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protected. For example, the PTO issues patents covering financial 
instruments,27 online gambling,28 electronic postage,29 health care 
administration systems,30 and a method of distributing digital music.31  
B. Taxonomy of Business Methods Patents 
The following taxonomy classifies business methods in terms of 
their effect on market behavior. Business-related inventions can be 
claimed as both products and processes,32 and the business method 
exception is applied to both. The invention in State Street was 
claimed as a business system (i.e., machine), rather than a process, 
because the law once favored software claimed as part of a system 
over software claimed as part of a process.33 Sensibly, the business 
method exception extended to such a system claims to avoid evasion 
of the rule. Courts could construe State Street narrowly to eliminate 
the business method exception only for business system patents, but 
the language in the case indicated that Judge Rich wanted to dispose 
of the exception entirely. ATT v. Excel followed soon after State 
Street and left no doubt on this matter. An AT&T invention claimed 
as a process involving pricing of long distance phone service was 
judged to be patentable subject matter.34  
Instead of focusing on claim format, I will focus on whether a 
 
 27. See U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (issued Mar. 9, 1993) (covering mutual fund); U.S. 
Patent No. 4,839,804 (issued June 13, 1989) (patenting a certificate of deposit that is designed 
to appreciate to meet college expenses); U.S. Patent No. 4,346,442 (issued Aug. 24, 1982) 
(patent on a system combining a charge card, a money market account). 
 28. U.S. Patent No. 5,800,268 (issued Sept. 1, 1998) (claiming an online gambling 
invention). 
 29. U.S. Patent No. 6,240,196 (issued May 29, 2001) (claiming electronic postage). 
 30. U.S. Patent No. 4,916,611 (issued Apr. 10, 1990) (claiming automated health care 
payment); U.S. Patent No. 5,070,452 (issued Dec. 3, 1991) (claiming a COBRA compliance 
system). 
 31. U.S. Patent No. 5,191,573 (issued Mar. 2, 1993) (claiming online music distribution). 
 32. Following a common practice, I use the term “product” informally to mean machine 
or system and the term “process” to mean process, art, or method. 
 33. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) led patent applicants to favor a machine 
claim format for software inventions. The patentee in Alappat successfully claimed a software 
related process as a machine by using means-plus-function language. See generally 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 (2001). 
 34. U.S. Patent No. 5,333,184 (issued July 26, 1994) (long distance telephone billing 
system). 
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business method patent protects a true process innovation or a 
product-related innovation. To capture the distinction between 
process innovations and product-related innovations, I will introduce 
the terms administrative method and customer service method to 
classify business methods. Administrative methods are back-office 
methods that increase productivity or reduce organizational or 
production costs in a firm.35 Customer service methods yield services 
that are consumed by customers or methods related to pricing, 
advertising, or other marketing concerns. I base this distinction on the 
function of the innovation in the market. Some business methods are 
consumable services and others are processes that contribute to 
business productivity.  
There are two reasons to classify some business methods as 
product-related innovations. First, the economic definition of product 
encompasses goods and services. A service, like a massage, is 
consumed by an end user, and a patent on a new method of 
massaging protects a new product variety. Second, some method 
patents give de facto protection to a product variety as well as a 
process. A broad patent that protects the only method (or only 
practical method) of implementing a financial security extends de 
facto protection to the financial security.36  
Customer service method inventors may create either new product 
varieties or new product features.37 Many business method patents 
 
 35. See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, Business To Business: It’s Just the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 7, 2000, at H1 (discussing the increased productivity available through the Internet). 
A decade ago, before the Internet, Wal-Mart connected the cash registers in its stores 
to its thousands of suppliers so that a shirt sold in Omaha registered with the company 
that made it in South Carolina. That pioneering system, however, required a huge 
investment in special computers and dedicated phone lines. Few other companies 
matched Wal-Mart’s achievement, and in 1998 Wal-Mart itself switched its network 
entirely to the less expensive, more flexible Internet. 
Id. 
 36. Economists speak of drastic and non-drastic process innovations. A drastic process 
innovation reduces the marginal cost of producing a product by a magnitude so large that no 
firm using a pre-existing process can compete with the innovator even if the innovator charges a 
monopoly price. Any process innovation of a lesser magnitude is called non-drastic. A patented 
drastic process yields de facto exclusive rights to the product produced using the process. See 
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 411-12 (1988). 
 37. A customer service inventor may even create a new product. For example, someone 
may create an online method for consumer financial management, and gain exclusive rights to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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could effectively provide exclusive rights to a new product variety in 
an established market. Examples include: the Signature Financial 
patent on the hub-and-spoke mutual fund,38 and other securities-based 
patents could protect new varieties of securities;39 the patent covering 
the use of online experts could protect a new variety of consulting;40 
the patent covering online gambling could protect a new variety of 
gambling;41 the patent on electronic postage protects a new substitute 
for the postage stamp and postal meters;42 and the patent on a cash 
management account protects a new variety of financial service.43 It 
is too early to tell whether these patents will actually give exclusive 
rights to a new product variety. We must wait for more information 
to assess the validity and breadth of these patents. If these patents are 
 
the market from a patent. I am not aware of any current business method patents that protect a 
new product, but I would not be surprised to see future examples. 
 38. See supra note 29. 
 39. See supra note 29. 
 40. U.S. Patent No. 5,862,223 (issued Jan. 19, 1999) (claiming the use of online experts). 
Similarly, a specific variety of wedding consultation might be protected by a method patent. See 
Jeffrey A. Berkowitz, Patenting The Com In “.Com,” in ECOMMERCE: STRATEGIES FOR 
SUCCESS IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, 570 PLI/PAT 643, 665 (1999) (“The Wedding Channel 
has a patent for planning weddings.”). 
 41. See id. at 670-71.  
Having just received U.S. Patent No. 5,800,268 in September 1998, for a “Method of 
participating in a live casino game from a remote location,” Home Gambling Network 
(HGN) wasted no time in enforcing its rights. In early December 1998, the company 
sued Interactive Television Services for patent infringement. The company then sued 
several other concerns, including UUNET, and settled with them in early March of 
1999. Most recently, on April 6, 1999, HGN sued Starnet Communications for patent 
infringement. 
Id. 
 42. See Berkowitz, supra note 40, at 669.  
Pitney Bowes, Inc., the dominant player in the postage-meter business, has several 
patents on computer-based postage metering. That company has been in contact with 
two companies involved in online postage systems, E-Stamp and Stamp Master, to 
discuss licensing those patents. The U.S. Postal Service has approved E-Stamp’s and 
Stamp Master’s systems for buying postage over the Internet and printing it onto 
envelopes. Pitney Bowes filed suit against E-Stamp, charging it with infringement of 
the Pitney Bowes patents. 
Id. 
 43. See Paine Webber v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) (holding that 
the patented invention combined a securities account, a money market account, and a credit 
card; advantage of this combination was better cash management (less idle cash), a higher credit 
limit on the credit card, and integrated monthly statements.). 
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valid but have a relatively narrow scope, that would leave the patent 
holder with an advantage in the market for the new variety, but no 
exclusivity. 
Other method patents relate to new or improved product features 
instead of new products or product varieties. For example, many e-
commerce patents protect features of Internet retailing sites. Patents 
are granted on: an online auction method;44 a method for real-time 
payments for Internet transactions;45 and a patent for an online 
method of evaluating credit risk;46 a method for paying web users 
who view web advertising;47 credit card security methods;48 methods 
of protecting consumer privacy;49 and a method of using one mouse 
click.50 Broad and valid patents of this sort allow a patent owner to 
differentiate its retail site by offering attractive and unique features. 
Customer service methods also include contract terms and other 
marketing strategies that economists treat like product features. 
Recent patents cover: airline ticket options;51 a method related to 
long-distance telephone pricing;52 a method that gives buyers price 
discounts based on the volume of orders;53 electronic distribution of 
coupons;54 and customized Internet promotions.55  
 
 44. U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207 (issued Aug. 11, 1998). 
 45. U.S. Patent No. 5,974,146 (issued Oct. 26, 1999). 
 46. See Berkowitz, supra note 40, at 666 (discussing automated loan decision patents). 
 47. See id. at 661. 
 48. See U.S. Patent No. 5,724,424 (issued Mar. 3, 1998). 
 49. See Berkowitz, supra note 40, at 666. 
 50. The specification of U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999) states,  
The present invention provides a method and system for single-action ordering of 
items in a client/server environment. The single-action ordering system of the present 
invention reduces the number of purchaser interactions needed to place an order and 
reduces the amount of sensitive information that is transmitted between a client system 
and a server system. 
See also Theresa Riordan, Patents Considered Vital to Thrive on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20, 1999, at C39 (reporting that Amazon.com holds a patent on a system that enables repeat 
online customers to avoid re-entering data when placing an order). 
 51. See U.S. Patent No. 5,797,127 (issued Aug. 18, 1998); Merges, supra note 26, at 579-
80 n.5 (describing a patent that “covers ‘airline ticket options,’ i.e., the purchase and sale of the 
right to buy tickets at a later time for a specified price”). 
 52. See supra note 34. 
 53. See Berkowitz, supra note 40, at 666. 
 54. See U.S. Patent No. RE34,915 (issued Apr. 25, 1995). 
 55. See U.S. Patent No. 6,009,411 (issued Dec. 28, 1999) (claiming a method for 
distributing promotions over the Internet). 
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Administrative method patents reach all sorts of management 
techniques. There are financial method patents relating to the analysis 
and presentation of financial data.56 There are patents on inventory 
and distribution management methods.57 There is a patent on a 
payment system.58 Various Internet-based manufacturing consulting 
inventions are probably patentable.59 There are even patented law-
related administrative methods.60  
Patenting customer service methods is more problematic than 
patenting administrative methods. Since customer service methods 
are closely connected to a particular market, the opening of a new 
market will induce a flood of customer service method inventions and 
patents. Administrative method inventions are less tied to a particular 
market and should not create the same risk of floods. Interestingly, 
proponents of business method patents tend to point to administrative 
method inventions to make their case, and opponents point to 
customer service methods. The recent PTO White Paper emphasizes 
that business method inventions in Class 705, automated data 
processing methods, follow a long tradition of invention in the field 
of data processing machinery like the IBM tabulator machine.61 On 
 
 56. See U.S. Patent No. 5,940,810 (issued Aug. 17, 1999) (claiming a method used to 
value securities); see also Berkowitz, supra note 40, at 665 (“Block Financial Corp. received a 
patent for accessing recent financial information from a variety of providers using a variety of 
presentation tools.”). 
 57. See U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643 (issued July 9, 1985) (covering a method of digital 
music distribution). 
 58. See supra note 30 (describing a health care payment method). 
 59. See Douglas Frantz, To Put G.E. Online Meant Putting a Dozen Industries Online, E-
Commerce: A Special Section, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2000, at H29 (describing three innovations 
at General Electric that are patentable subject matter after State Street). GE developed a Web 
site where its engineers in 100 countries can share ideas and work on projects simultaneously. 
Id. Next, G.E. created “‘wizards’ that enable customers to solve complex problems on the Web. 
A design engineer at a manufacturing company, for example, can log on to the G.E. plastics site 
and use a specialized engineering calculator to determine a polycarbonate’s strength, adhesion 
and color.” Id. Finally, the G.E. aircraft-engines business implemented imaging methods 
through a Web site in a way that cuts the cost of engine repairs. In the past, a G.E. 
representative would visit a customer and inspect engine parts to decide whether they could be 
retained or rebuilt, or discarded for a new part. Now, much of that work can be done cheaply 
and quickly over the Internet with images transmitted from the customer to G.E. Id. 
 60. See supra note 30; see also Riordan, supra note 50, at C39 (describing a patent on a 
method of allocating assets in a divorce settlement); U.S. Patent No. 6,246,991 (issued June 12, 
2001) (patenting software for implementing multimedia wills). 
 61. See generally USPTO White Paper, supra note 12. Business machines play a role in a 
firm comparable to an administrative method. For example, the photocopier is a durable 
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the other hand, opponents point to the patents on securities and ask 
whether there was adequate incentive for financial innovation without 
patents.62 
III. PATENT FLOODS 
A patent flood occurs when many inventors apply for patents on 
similar inventions during an interval of a few years.63 A recent 
example is the flood of gene patents.64 The development of efficient 
gene sequencing technology and the Human Genome Project 
provided the impetus for a flood of gene discoveries and patents.65 
Earlier patent floods occurred in the motion picture, airplane, and 
petroleum-refining industries. The motion picture and airplane patent 
floods followed the efforts of Edison and the Wright brothers 
demonstrating technical feasibility of the motion picture and the 
airplane. The flood of petroleum refining patents followed the 
discovery of the cracking process of refining. The flood of e-
commerce and other business method patents66 is the latest patent 
flood. 
There has been a dramatic rise in the number of business method 
patents since State Street.67 In particular, the number of e-commerce 
 
business machine that provides a flow of copying service. A substantial portfolio of patents 
relating to xerography gave Xerox a monopoly in the market for photocopiers. See SCM Corp. 
v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981). Buyers and lessees value this copying 
service the same way they value an administrative method that reduces some other 
administrative cost. If Xerox invented and patented an administrative method related to 
document management that drastically reduced the number of copies required by organizations, 
the economic effect would have been quite similar to the actual case. 
 62. See Pollock, infra note 129; see also infra note 130. 
 63. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting, *5, at http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~shapiro/thicket.pdf (Mar. 2001) (noting 
recent patent floods in various industries). 
 64. See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
 65. See Andrew Pollack, Approaching Biology from a Different Angle: Scientist at Work: 
Leroy Hood, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2001), at www.nytimes.com/2001/04/17/health/17HOOD. 
html. 
 66. See Richard H. Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on 
Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J 105, 154 (1999) 
(“Given the boom or land rush in applications for patents on methods of doing business, 
particularly in regard to electronic commerce, the matter is urgent.”). 
 67. See Sabra Chartrand, Patents: E-Commerce Spurs Changes at Patent Office, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2000, at C6. In 1997, the PTO established “department 570” for business 
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patents jumped,68 as have the number of financial patents.69 Two 
factors jointly caused the flood of e-commerce patents: (1) the 
introduction of the Internet; and (2) the demise of the business 
method exception. The introduction of the Internet is a technical 
breakthrough equivalent to the Wright brothers’ flight at Kitty Hawk. 
The Internet makes e-commerce possible and e-commerce creates 
new opportunities for invention. 
Equally, the expansion of patentable subject matter sanctioned by 
State Street caused the flood of e-commerce patents since most of the 
e-commerce inventions would not be patentable subject matter under 
pre-State Street standards. In contrast, the flood of financial patents is 
caused strictly by the demise of the business method exception 
because there has not been a technical breakthrough in the financial 
services industry.70 
Eliminating the business method exception will increase the 
frequency of future patent floods. Past patent floods were set off by a 
technical breakthrough. Such technical breakthroughs will continue 
to occur to set off patent floods. Any change in patent law that 
increases the range of patentable subject matter will naturally 
 
method patents. Applications rose from 920 in 1997, to 1,300 in 1998, and to 2,600 in 1999. In 
1999, the PTO issued 583 business method software patents. Id. 
 68. See Stern, supra note 66, at 154; see also Riordan, supra note 50. There are about half 
a dozen firms modeled after Walker Digital, each hoping to become patent factories. Walker 
Digital received thirty patents including the key Priceline.com patent covering online auctions 
and also has 300 pending patent applications. Id. 
 69. Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance Patents, 1971-
2000, *7-8, at http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/StateStreet.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2002) 
(describing a dramatic increase in the number of financial patents starting in 1997). 
 70. Defenders of the State Street decision disagree with my view that the case eliminated 
the business method exception. Both Judge Rich and Judge Newman, searched the case law and 
found only weak support in dicta establishing a business method exception. In re Schrader, 22 
F.3d 290, 297-98 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Judge Rich intended to dispel the misperception that a 
business method exception existed. He argued that cases supposedly standing for the business 
method exception could be better explained through application of the rule that abstract 
principles are unpatentable. Although I think his treatment of the cases is reasonable, Judge 
Rich evades the longstanding PTO rule against patents on business methods and the consensus 
among commentators, including himself at an earlier date, that there was a business method 
exception. For further critical commentary, see the excellent analysis in Thomas, supra note 13. 
Whether State Street eliminated the business method exception or simply clarified established 
law, it set off a flood of business method patents. Defenders of State Street admit this result, but 
blandly assert that State Street made practitioners aware of a class of inventions they previously 
overlooked. See USPTO White Paper, supra note 12. 
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increase the frequency of patent floods by bringing a wider range of 
technology within the ambit of patent protection. Thus, the 
Chakrabarty decision, which confirmed that living organisms are 
patentable subject matter, increased the likelihood of biotechnology 
patent floods by broadening the range of biotechnology that is 
patentable. State Street has the same of effect by making software 
implemented business methods patentable.  
However, State Street has two other effects that create special 
concern. First, a technological breakthrough is no longer a 
precondition for a patent flood. Any factor that opens a new market 
might set off a future flood of business method patents. New markets 
often yield various new methods of doing business—all of which can 
now be patented. Second, future technological breakthroughs might 
set off two different patent floods: a flood of patents covering the 
relevant technology and a flood of patents covering business methods 
in the new market opened by the breakthrough.71 
Fears about future business method patent floods could be allayed 
by a narrow interpretation of State Street and a rigorous application 
of the nonobviousness standard. The courts, though, may allow a 
broad reach of patent law to all sorts of business methods72 with a 
modest role for the nonobviousness requirement. A broad reading of 
State Street allows business method claims that do not mention 
 
 71. Note that even if the technical breakthrough does not set off a flood of technology-
based patents, it is possible it will set off a flood of business method-based patents. 
 72. Several scholars expressed concern about the broad reach of State Street. See, e.g., 
Stern, supra note 66, at 154 (“Accordingly, a line of subsequent poor decisions based on State 
Street should be anticipated.”); see also Raskind, supra note 12, at 91. 
A further source of unease over this opinion is its potential for generating a boom in 
business method patents. This protection extends to fields other than financial services 
. . . . Banking, insurance, and accounting are most likely to be immediately involved in 
seeking such patent protection. However, protection is unlikely to be limited to these 
sectors. 
Id.; John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENTER. L.J. 3, 4 (1999). 
In its place the Federal Circuit required only that a claimed process achieve a useful 
result, an exceptionally lenient standard that appears to place few limitations on the 
possibilities for private appropriation. Keenly aware of these holdings, applicants have 
besieged the Patent Office with applications ranging from financial software to 
Internet-based business models.  
Id. 
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software.73 Judge Rich apparently acknowledged that the pre-
computer method, in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.,74 
is patentable subject matter. This patent covered a manufacture and 
process designed to prevent waiters and other restaurant employees 
from falsifying sales and receipts. Judge Rich explained that the 
patent was invalidated on obviousness grounds and not because it 
claimed a business method. After State Street, he would also 
determine a diaper service to be patentable subject matter. More 
significantly, basic business method innovations like the distribution 
system at Sears,75 the multi-divisional structure of the firm, and the 
Fed-Ex hub-and-spoke air delivery system are now likely to be 
patentable subject matter. 
IV. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY PATENT FLOODS 
Patent floods can exacerbate three social costs attributable to 
patents: (1) high licensing and litigation costs; (2) exclusionary 
misuse of patents; and (3) a retarding effect on diffusion and 
cumulative innovation.76 Patents deter entry or induce exit of firms 
competing with a patent owner. Exclusion of competitors is justified 
when a firm owns a strong and valid patent. However, exclusion can 
also be achieved with the aid of weak or invalid patents. A large firm 
 
 73. See Merges, supra note 26, at n.24; cf. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, 
Inc., No. 00-1109, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2163, at *44 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2001) (holding that 
the ‘411 patent specification states that “one skilled in the art would appreciate that the single-
action ordering techniques can be used in various environments other than the Internet”). 
 74. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
 75. Sears devised a distribution method that gave it a great cost advantage in retailing in 
the early 1900s. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF 
INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 59-62 (1990).  
The heart of the operation . . . was the scheduling system, which helped assure 
consistently high stock-turn. A complex, rigidly enforced timetable made it possible to 
fill a steady stream of orders from a large number of different departments. Each 
department was given fifteen minutes to send the assembling rooms the items listed on 
a specific order. If any items failed to appear within that time period, the order was 
shipped without them. The delayed part of the order was sent by prepaid express as 
soon as it was ready, and the negligent department was charged both for the extra 
express cost and for a fine of fifty cents per item. 
Id. at 61. 
 76. For a similar list of social costs associated with patents, see Kenneth Dam, The 
Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247 (1994). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/12
p309 Meurer book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Business Method Patents and Patent Floods 323 
 
 
can use the threat of patent litigation to drive smaller firms out of a 
market. The threat may succeed even if the patent is likely invalid or 
the defendant is unlikely to be an infringer. The high cost of 
defending a patent suit can strain the financial resources of a small 
start-up company. Potential entrants will survey market niches and 
try to steer clear of niches with many patents so they can reduce the 
risk of patent litigation. 
Although patents certainly promote innovation, they also retard 
diffusion of technology and cumulative innovation. Patent owners 
slow diffusion by refusing to license their patents, or more 
commonly, by charging royalties that discourage efficient use of 
patented inventions. Patent owners slow cumulative innovation by 
bargaining for a share of the surplus created by inventors who 
improve the patented invention or use it in their research.77 Naturally, 
the incentive to improve patented inventions is diminished compared 
to the case in which the improver keeps the entire surplus from the 
improvement.  
Patent floods lead to lower quality patents exacerbating the first 
two social costs. “Low patent quality” is shorthand for such problems 
as overlapping claims, inappropriately broad claims, slow patent 
prosecution, and patents on obvious inventions.78 The problem of 
overlapping claims is inherent to patent floods because of the 
likelihood of near simultaneous invention and multiple patent 
applications covering the same invention. The other problems arise 
because of the difficulty the PTO has dealing with patent floods.79 
Time pressure, lack of expertise, and lack of prior art yield low patent 
quality during floods.80 The PTO directs patent applications to 
 
 77. Improvers are usually infringers and need a license from the patent owner of the basic 
invention. 
 78. See Merges, supra note 26, at 590 (discussing the low quality of software and business 
method patents); see also Lerner, supra note 69, at 24. U.S. Patent No. 5,884,286 (issued Mar. 
16, 1999) entitled “Apparatus and process for executing an expiration less option transaction.” 
Patent does not cite a wealth of academic prior art that quite possibly makes the invention 
unpatentable. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2163 
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2001) (reversing a preliminary injunction against Barnes and Noble because 
of substantial questions regarding patent validity). 
 79. Even a well-run PTO will suffer from these problems. For a general explanation that 
good patent policy calls for limited resources and a limited examination process, see Mark 
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. L. REV. 1495 (2001). 
 80. The PTO has instituted a mandatory second review of business method patents to 
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examiners in the field of technology appropriate for the claimed 
invention. A flood in a particular field means that the average time to 
complete prosecution rises as resources are stretched.81 The demand 
for skilled people in the emerging area of technology makes it 
difficult to attract and retain examiners in the field.82 And the 
technical breakthrough precipitating a flood might take a while to 
enter the prior art.83  
Low patent quality increases patent licensing and litigation cost. 
These costs increase because bargaining becomes more difficult and 
the probability of patent disputes grows as quality deteriorates. 
Delayed patent prosecution, and numerous and overlapping patents, 
make it costly for a possible infringer to negotiate a license or even 
determine with whom to bargain. Overly broad claims 
inappropriately expand the number of potential infringers and the 
probability of litigation. Additionally, when numerous inventors84 
own related patents and patent applications, there are apt to be 
disputes about priority or the scope of similar claims.85 
Periods of patent flood magnify the problem of exclusionary 
conduct. Patent floods often coincide with the birth of a new industry. 
The normal life-cycle of an industry begins with a large number of 
small firms, followed by a period of shake-out when many firms 
 
increase the quality of the examination process. See William M. Bulkeley, Fewer Patents on 
Methods Get Clearance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at A3. 
 81. See Chartrand, supra note 67, at C6 (noting that the PTO recently increased training, 
supervision, and staff in response to complaints about examination of business method patents). 
 82. See id. Patenting Business Methods, A White Paper of the AIPLA, at 
www.aipla.org/html/whitepaper2.html (Nov. 27, 2000) (calling for better training of examiners 
and better collection of prior art by the PTO). 
 83. See Lerner, supra note 69, at 26-27; see also Sabra Chartrand, Federal Agency 
Rethinks Internet Patents: Government Changing Its Evaluations of Business-Method Filings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2000, at C4 (quoting critics who claim the PTO does not “understand 
what business methods are widely used or already in the public domain”). 
 84. The flood of finance patents is distributed to a large and diverse collection of patent 
owners. See Lerner, supra note 69, at 9. 
 85. See Teresa Riordan, Patents: Historians Take a Longer View of Net Battles, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at C1 (“The most extreme example of simultaneous development is when 
you have Alexander Graham Bell and Elisha Gray arriving at the patent office on the same day 
with the idea of the telephone,” said the author of “Media Technology and Society: A History 
From the Telegraph to the Internet.”). 
 Gray and Bell settled their differences, with Gray getting a $100,000 settlement and 
lucrative contract work. But the early days of the telephone were marked by many other patent 
disputes. At one point the Bell System had 600 pending patent infringement cases. Id. 
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fail.86 Thus, there is a large population of start-ups that are vulnerable 
to exclusionary tactics. Low quality patent examination makes it easy 
for a dominant firm intent on exclusion to collect a portfolio of 
patents.87 Even if the patent flood does not promote socially 
unwarranted exclusionary tactics, it may have a negative impact on 
industry evolution. The patent flood raises the cost of entry to the 
new market, and overly broad or invalid patents may favor inefficient 
producers who survive the shake-out at the expense of more efficient, 
but patent-poor firms.88  
These problems are becoming apparent in e-commerce markets 
that entered the shake-out phase.89 Commentators predict huge 
amounts of patent litigation.90 Weak or invalid business method 
 
 86. See Steven Klepper & Elizabeth Graddy, The Evolution of New Industries and the 
Determinants of Market Structure, 21 RAND J. ECON. 27, 28-35 (1990) (gathering evidence that 
shows that new industries first experience rapid entry, followed by a shake-out phase when 
many more firms exit than enter, and finally a mature phase with a steady number of firms). 
 87. Dominant firms can patent their own inventions and purchase patent rights from other 
firms, especially those exiting the market during a shake-out. See, e.g., Kevin G. Rivette & 
David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, 78 HARV. BUS. REV. 54, 64 
(2000) (a stent manufacturer bought out a company to gain access to its patent portfolio to 
bolster its position in a patent infringement suit); Gwendolyn Mariano, Net Shakeout More 
Sweeping Than Expected, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-6186603.html (June 4, 
2001) (describing the “incredible” rate of acquisition of failed Internet firms). 
 88. See Klepper & Graddy, supra note 86, at 28. In this model, “factors governing the 
early evolution of industries will shape their market structure at maturity.” Id. Specifically, the 
model shows that increasing the cost of imitation in a new industry tends to raise the level of 
concentration as the industry matures. See also Rivette & Kline, supra note 87, at 66 (arguing 
that patents are often decisive in determining which firms survive the shakeout phase of the 
industrial life cycle). 
 89. See Bob Tedeschi, When Digital Darwinists Seek Their Predators, N.Y. TIMES, June 
26, 2000, at C10 (describing a shake-out of Internet retailers causing a wave of consolidation); 
Mariano, supra note 87; see generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents 
Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000). 
 90. For example, the two major remaining providers of free Internet access are suing each 
other over infringement of patents that cover aspects of Internet advertising critical to their 
business model. See Matt Richtel, NetZero Sues Juno Online in a Patent Dispute Over 
Advertising, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2000, at C3. Stern, supra note 66, at 105 n.98. 
 See “Boom” in Business Method Patent Filings Has Followed State Street Ruling, PTO 
Says, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 115 (Dec. 10, 1998). Forbes suggests that e-
commerce magnates may “try to turn patents into the barbed wire of the Internet.” Josh 
McHugh, Barbed Wire on the Internet, FORBES, May 17, 1999, at 183. The American Banker 
asserts that the State Street decision “threatens to embroil the financial services industry in 
hundreds of patent infringement lawsuits, creating possible liability exceeding $2 billion.” Jaret 
Seidberg, Ruling Threatens Banks With Patent Lawsuits, AM. BANKER, Sept. 2, 1998, at 3. A 
story in IP Magazine warns that “a firestorm of litigation threatens to engulf corporate 
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patents might be used to deter entry,91 or induce firms to accept 
licenses.92 Moreover, patent suits will shape the structure of the 
industry by encouraging mergers.93 
Patent floods also exacerbate the costs from slowed diffusion and 
cumulative innovation.94 The transaction costs associated with 
obtaining numerous licenses may retard technical progress.95 These 
transaction costs probably rise faster than the number of patents 
because multilateral bargaining is more difficult than bilateral 
bargaining. Furthermore, the flood of patents increases the likelihood 
that different parties will own patents on complementary 
inventions—i.e., inventions that efficiency dictates should be used 
 
America” and predicts “large-scale disruption of U.S. commerce, as sharp operators move to 
patent business methods and assert patents against the unsuspecting.” Robert M. Kunstadt, 
Opening Pandora’s Box, IP MAG., Jan. 1999, at http://www.ipmag.com/monthly/99-
jan/kunstadt.html (last visited May 12, 1999). 
 91. See Shapiro, supra note 63, at 34. 
Our current patent system is causing a potentially dangerous situation in several fields, 
including biotechnology, semiconductors, computer software, and e-commerce in 
which a would-be entrepreneur or innovator may face a barrage of infringement 
actions that it must overcome to bring its product or service to market. In other words, 
we are in danger of crea[t]ing significant transactions costs for those seeking to 
commercialize new technology based on multiple patents, overlapping rights, and 
hold-up problems. 
Id.; Dreyfuss, supra note 89, at 270 (noting that an entry deterrent effect created by business 
method patents that are likely to be invalid). 
 92. See Seth Shulman, Software Patents Tangle the Web, 103 TECH. REV. 68, 71-72 
(2000). There will be a lot of cross-licensing of e-commerce patents because many of the 
patents are invalid. Even though the odds of invalidity are high, the patents are powerful 
weapons. Id. 
 93. See generally James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44 
(predicting that new e-commerce patents will continue to flood the PTO and surprise 
entrepreneurs; patent suits are a catalyst for mergers). 
 94. See Matt Richtel, Chairman of Amazon Urges Reduction of Patent Terms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000, at C4. The chairman of Amazon.com has acknowledged that business 
method patents may stifle others from building on patented innovations. “He is calling for the 
government to limit patents for software and Internet business models to three to five years and 
to require a period for public comment on patent applications in those areas before they are 
granted.” Id. 
 95. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 64; Riordan, supra note 85 (quoting historian 
Amy Friedlender: “‘A radio patent pool was finally formed in 1919’ . . . . ‘One of the reasons it 
was formed was there were so many patents and so much cross-licensing that development of 
radio had become almost sclerotic’”); Shulman, supra note 92, at 76 (describing a thicket of 
patents that created problems for development of automobiles and airplanes in the United 
States). 
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together. The owners of complementary patents have an incentive to 
charge combined license fees even higher than the monopoly license 
fee.96 Finally, when a technical breakthrough opens a new market, a 
flood of business method patents could block commercial 
exploitation of the underlying technology. The cost of negotiating 
appropriate business method patent licenses reduces the incentive 
effect of broad patent protection for a technical pioneer.97 
V. CAN POOLING AND CROSS-LICENSING SOLVE THE PROBLEMS 
CREATED BY PATENT FLOODS? 
Patent floods usually induce extensive patent licensing managed 
through patent pools or cross-licensing agreements.98 A patent license 
is a contract in which a patent owner grants the licensee permission to 
practice the patented invention.99 Cross-licensing describes reciprocal 
patent licenses that two or more patent owners grant to each other. 
Pooling is more comprehensive than cross-licensing. Patent pools 
include many members and gather most or all of the patents in an 
industry.100 Typically, a pool issues a blanket license authorizing use 
of all the patents in the pool.101 The license revenue is distributed to 
members in proportion to the value of the patents they contributed to 
the pool.102  
Pools and cross-licensing mitigate two of the negative effects of 
patent floods, but sometimes create new problems. They reduce 
transaction costs and avoid the uncertainty of litigation cost created 
by a flood of patents.103 The blanket license eliminates worries about 
 
 96. See Shapiro, supra note 63, at 6-10 (arguing that complementary patents are priced 
too high and hidden patents create a danger of hold-up). 
 97. Thanks to Pam Samuelson for suggesting this point. 
 98. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1341 n.162 (1996) (citing patent 
consolidation in over twenty industries in the early part of the twentieth century). 
 99. A patent owner may refuse to license without violating antitrust law. See SCM Corp. 
v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981). But see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 410-13 (1988) (citing the many benefits to licensing).  
 100. Members of the pool assign their patents to a holding company or trade association. 
See Merges, supra note 98, at 1341-42. 
 101. See id.  
 102. See id.  
 103. George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309, 
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patent litigation based on any of the patents in the pool. Transaction 
costs are low because monitoring costs are reduced for patent owners 
and licensees only need to negotiate a single blanket license. For the 
same reasons, they also cut through a thicket of patents that otherwise 
could stall production and development in an industry facing a patent 
flood.104 On the other hand, pooling and cross-licensing cause a 
variety of anticompetitive harms. 
Antitrust law shows considerable deference to patent licenses.105 
The owner of a broad patent on an important invention is supposed to 
enjoy significant exclusionary power and monopoly profit regardless 
of whether the patent is licensed. High profit provides the incentive to 
seek important inventions. Thus, a cross-license agreement should 
secure monopoly profits for the owners of a pair of essential, 
complementary inventions.106 A similar statement holds for licenses 
settling priority disputes. A license that allows two inventors to split 
the monopoly profit from an invention serves social welfare if one of 
them is surely entitled to the patent.107 Despite these benefits 
anticompetitive harms do exist. Pools and cross-licensing can insulate 
invalid patents from challenge, expand the scope of minor patents, 
and facilitate collusive pricing. 
Pools and cross-licensing pose anticompetitive threats because: it 
is hard to distinguish settlement of a legitimate priority dispute from 
a cross-license between the owners of two sham patents; and it is 
hard to distinguish settlement of a legitimate dispute about scope of 
 
358-59 (1977) (noting that pools reduce litigation and uncertainty); Robert P. Merges, 
Comment, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 
(1994) (noting that patent pooling in the radio industry reduced transaction costs). 
 104. The PTO touted patent pools as the solution to the problem created by the thicket of 
gene patents. See USPTO, Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology 
Patents?, at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patpoolcover.html (Jan. 19, 2001); see 
also Shapiro, supra note 63 (approving pooling of complementary patents to fight through 
patent thicket). 
 105. Joint price and output choice are not per se illegal when practiced by a pool. See, e.g., 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) (discussing price fixing by a copyright 
pool). 
 106. More precisely, if the single owner of the pair of complementary patents can 
command a monopoly profit, then two owners should be allowed to obtain the same profit 
through cross-licensing. 
 107. Again, if the patent securely in the hands of one of the inventors generates monopoly 
profit, then no problem exists with a license that allows two inventors to split the monopoly 
profit. 
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claims and infringement from a cross-license between the owners of 
two minor patents.108 Many patents issued during a flood cover 
insignificant inventions and many patents are invalid. Licensing to 
settle patent litigation might be a socially desirable way to avoid 
litigation cost, but it also might be part of a collusive strategy.109  
The other anticompetitive threat is a pool or cross-licensing 
agreement justified as a way to cut through a patent thicket and 
economize on transaction costs might actually serve merely to 
orchestrate collusion on prices. A patent license may include terms 
that would normally violate the antitrust rule against price fixing. For 
example, a license might specify the sale price, geographic market, or 
output level of the end product made using a patent.110 Such terms 
make it easier to establish and enforce a cartel.111 If the patents in the 
pool are substitutes, the effect is similar to firms merging to 
monopoly.112 Antitrust law gives us many likely examples of patent 
pools facilitating collusion.113  
 
 108. Pooling or cross-licensing patents on competing technologies may be anticompetitive 
if excluded firms need a license to effectively compete in the relevant market. See U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2001). 
 109. See Michael J. Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 77 
(1989); see, e.g., Priest, supra note 103, at 309-10 (describing the difficulty in distinguishing 
legitimate patent exploitation from patent licenses used to orchestrate a cartel).  
 110. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 830-31 (2000).  
 111. George Priest suggested the license agreement between G.E. and Westinghouse might 
have been used to fix price. See Priest, supra note 103. But see United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
272 U.S. 476 (1926) (sustaining validity of the patent license). See also Ian Ayres, How Cartels 
Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295 (1987); 
Summit Tech., Inc., No. 9286 (Aug. 21, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
1998/9808/d0928viagr.htm (FTC claimed a patent pool was protecting an invalid patent). 
 112. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1815, 1867-68 (1984). 
The problem of patent accumulation, the aggregation of several or numerous patents 
under single ownership or control, is conceptually indistinguishable from the merger 
problem under antitrust law . . . . A pool of competing patents can be more readily 
analogized to a loose association than to a horizontal merger. This, of course, depends 
upon one’s evaluation of the pool’s efficiency-creating potential. A pool of competing 
patents is difficult to distinguish from the cartel in this respect. 
Id. 
 113. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); Standard 
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
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The risk of price-fixing disguised as a patent pool is surely 
decreased by the threat of antitrust enforcement—likewise 
agreements that expand patent scope or protect invalid patents. Yet, 
deterrence alone is probably inadequate because of a substantial 
danger of undetected collusion.114 Deterrence is also limited because 
enforcement agencies fear that overzealous antitrust enforcement will 
discourage socially desirable patent pools and cross-licenses. The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) announced guidelines that help fine tune 
public antitrust enforcement.115 But, we should not be too optimistic 
that antitrust law can finely distinguish pro-competitive from anti-
competitive pooling and cross-licensing.116 
My discussion so far suggests that pooling or cross-licensing 
inevitably follows a patent flood—but that is not true. The multi-
party bargaining problem facing patent owners is a major 
impediment. History shows that agreements are easier to reach in 
industries with homogeneous members who deal with each other 
repeatedly.117 History also shows longstanding bargaining impasses 
 
Nelson, On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 896 (1990) 
(illustrating cartelization by the light bulb patent pool); Merges, supra note 98, at n.224 
(describing cartelization by pool in United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523 
(S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff’d, 323 U.S. 319 (1947)); Priest, supra note 103, at 330-32 (describing the 
pooling of harrow patents used to cartelize the harrow market); id. at 366-70 (weighing strong 
evidence of both efficiency and collusion in relation to a pool of patents relating to methods of 
refining petroleum).  
 114. See Priest, supra note 103, at 329 (noting that with cross-licensing it is more difficult 
to distinguish cartelization from legitimate exploitation); Kaplow, supra note 112, at 1865-67. 
Antitrust scrutiny failed to detect collusion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 
(1931) (upholding a pool comprised of competing patents when its examination failed to 
uncover any restraint of trade or monopolization).  
 115. Two important rules of thumb are that pooled patents should be complements not 
substitutes. See Priest, supra note 103, at 357-58 (distinguishing cross-licensing of substitute 
and complementary patents). Pool members must reasonably fear infringing each others’ 
patents. See Merges, supra note 98, at 1293 n.225 (“Where industry members are seen to 
pervasively infringe each other’s patents, and where valuation and exchange mechanisms 
appear to serve no ulterior purpose beyond setting compensation for these infringements, a real 
working pool is in effect.”). The DOJ view pooling as procompetitive when it integrates 
complementary inventions, and reduces transaction and litigation costs. See ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES, supra note 108. Open licensing of non-members helps protect a pool from 
antitrust violation. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network 
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 538 (1998); cf. USPTO, supra note 104 (encouraging 
patent pooling as a solution to the problems caused by the flood of gene patents). 
 116. See Priest, supra note 103; Merges, supra note 98. 
 117. See Merges, supra note 98, at 1341. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/12
p309 Meurer book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Business Method Patents and Patent Floods 331 
 
 
are possible.118 In addition, the threat of antitrust litigation may deter 
some pools and cross-licensing agreements.119 
VI. FLOOD CONTROL: REDUCING THE FREQUENCY OF BUSINESS 
METHOD PATENT FLOODS 
Sections 101 and 103 of the Patent Act offer opportunities to 
reduce the frequency of patent floods either by limiting the extent to 
which business methods are patentable subject matter or by making it 
difficult to show business method inventions are nonobvious.120 At 
this early stage we cannot be sure how broadly the Federal Circuit 
will read State Street. Experience with software patentability suggests 
the court will read it quite broadly.121 It is also too early to know how 
rigorously the § 103 non-obviousness requirement will be applied to 
business methods.  
Two questions left open after State Street are critical to 
determining the extent of business method patentability. First, are 
business methods that lack a software implementation patentable? 
Second, what kinds of methods are useful, tangible, and concrete? 
State Street and the follow-up case, AT&T v. Excel, are surprisingly 
 
 118. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 113, at 896-97. 
There is therefore no guarantee that pooling, cross licensing, or consolidation will 
always emerge to break an industry impasse. And without these solutions there is 
nothing to mitigate the effect of broad basic patents in cumulative technology 
industries. Earlier we saw that theory offered a number of reasons to be concerned 
about these patents. The historical evidence available is consistent with this theory. In 
most instances this evidence can be read as supportive of our concerns about the 
effects of broad patents on cumulative technology industries. 
Id. 
 119. See Merges, supra note 98, at 1355. But favorable business review letters from the 
DOJ encouraged three recent patent pools. The DOJ issued business review letters sanctioning 
three recent patent pools to share royalties from patents covering the Moving Picture Expert 
Group (MPEG) 2 compression technology standard, and patents on certain digital video disc 
(DVD)-Video and DVD-ROM standard specifications and products. See generally supra note 
104; Steven C. Carlson, Note: Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 
359 (1999) (describing patent pools covering video compression and encryption technology). 
 120. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1952). 
 121. See Raskind, supra note 12, at 33 (forecasting further decline of subject matter 
boundaries). 
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vague on these matters.122 A narrow reading treats these two cases as 
software cases holding that there is no reason to discriminate against 
software merely because it has a business purpose.123 Under this 
narrow reading, business method claims that lack a software 
implementation could be rejected for being outside the bounds of 
patentable processes. Yet, even under this narrow reading, State 
Street will have a significant economic impact because software 
based claims will often preempt any practical use of a business 
method.124  
A broad reading of these cases opens the door to patents on the 
full spectrum of management techniques. A software limitation on 
patentable subject matter might not be required because Judge Rich 
nowhere limited his ruling to software and he cited old business 
method cases predating computer technology.125 Additionally, the 
language in State Street emphasizes there is no need for a physical 
transformation to make a process patentable.126 If patentable 
 
 122. See id. at 62. “[T]he recent decision which announced this startling conclusion 
provides neither explanation, limitation, nor rationale.” Id. Thomas, supra note 72, at 25-27 
(criticizing the weak arguments made by Judge Rich when he rejected the business method 
exception). 
 123. Francisco Marius Keeley-Domokos, Intellectual Property: State Street Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153 (1999). Instead, the 
business methods that will continue to be patented will probably involve computer software, 
and will also qualify as machines through proper use of means-plus-function claims. 
 124. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (computer essential to practice method). 
 125. John Kasdan, Obviousness and New Technologies, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENTER. L.J. 159 (1999). 
Since he referred to cases from as long ago as 1908 which far pre-date the computer, it 
is arguably the case that Rich was suggesting that even business methods which are 
implemented without the use of a computer should be eligible for patent protection 
(although it appears that, under current practice, the PTO would reject such 
applications). 
Id. 
 126. See Merges, supra note 26, at 577 n.24. 
Indeed, there is a fair argument that a business concept is patentable whether or not it 
is implemented on a computer: [In State Street Bank] the Federal Circuit indicated that 
whether an invention is directed to patentable subject matter under § 101 does not 
depend on whether a “physical” transformation takes place or whether the claim is 
directed to a process or a machine. From this, it might then follow that a claimed 
process for, e.g., performing the function similar to Signature’s invention, is patentable 
even absent its use with a computer. As long as the variables represent some set 
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processes are freed from a connection with physical apparatus, then 
the full range of business methods discussed in Part II may be 
patentable subject matter.127 Of course, it is possible that the words 
“useful, tangible, and concrete” will be invoked to limit the range of 
business methods that are patentable.128 
Policy arguments are not much of a guide in predicting how 
broadly the Federal Circuit will interpret State Street. The policy 
arguments for and against expanding patentable subject matter to 
include business methods are not well developed. Proponents favor 
the broadest reach of patentable subject matter consistent with the 
statute and the Constitution.129 They believe that the incentive effect 
created by patent property rights is desirable in any field of 
innovation. Opponents claim that 200 years of experience shows that 
 
monetary values, it arguably should not matter who or what does the “transforming.” 
After all, regardless of the transforming mechanism (e.g., machine or human), the 
invention can be said to have “practical utility,” and produce a “useful, concrete and 
tangible result. 
Id. 
 127. See Thomas, supra note 72, at 6 (“Disconnected from particular physical apparatus, 
such patents will set forth not so much technical artifacts, but a broad category of proprietary 
modes of analysis, techniques and protocols from disciplines ranging from the social sciences to 
the law.”). 
 128. See Keeley-Domokos, supra note 123, at 153. 
The type of business methods that are likely to benefit from the State Street decision, 
however, are probably more material than just general functional operating schemes. 
The court in State Street repeatedly reiterated the utility of the invention disclosed in 
Signature’s patent, while concurrently emphasizing the concreteness and materiality of 
the result that the invention achieved. The State Street decision seems to indicate that 
to be patentable, business methods must achieve concrete and material results in 
addition to being useful. If this interpretation is correct, it would probably be difficult 
for a company to prove that a general operating business plan developed by that 
company deserves patent protection. To satisfy the requirements of concreteness and 
materiality, such a company would probably have to provide conclusive evidence that 
the new business method decreases operating costs, increases productivity, or achieves 
some other tangible economic benefit. Such an analysis would probably involve 
complex forecasting techniques and rely on economic assumptions and projections. 
The speculative nature of such endeavors probably reduces the likelihood that 
companies will attempt to patent general business operating methods. 
Id. 
 129. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (subject matter broadest possible reading because 
Congress did not intend any limitations); see Malla Pollock, The Possible Unconstitutionality of 
Business Method Patents: Common Sense and History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
61 (2002) (arguing that the business method patent in State Street violates the Patent Clause of 
the Constitution).  
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there is adequate incentive to invent new business methods even if 
the methods are not patentable.130 They oppose patents because they 
could create market power and slow diffusion of new business 
methods.131 I agree with this reason for opposing patents on business 
methods, but it has not impressed the Federal Circuit so far.132 
The Court should revive the business method exception, or at least 
employ a narrow reading that limits business method patents to 
methods with a software implementation. Reviving the business 
method exception would return us to a world in which customer 
service methods get relatively little intellectual property protection.133 
Some administrative methods would still be eligible for patent 
protection and many would benefit from trade secret protection. I 
greatly prefer trade secret protection because most of the flood 
problems I described in Part IV apply to patents but not trade 
secrets.134 A broad reading of State Street is most harmful because it 
 
 130. See Raskind, supra note 12, at 92-93 (discussing an adequate incentive for innovation 
in business methods without patent protection); Thomas, supra note 72, at 58 (favoring a 
restriction of method patents to industrial applications). 
 131. See Dreyfuss, supra note 89, at 275 (arguing the social cost of business method 
patents exceed the social benefits).  
 132. Let me take a moment to comment a little further on policy analysis of the bounds of 
patentable subject matter. The core trade-off in judging the social value of a patent compares 
the increased incentive to invent arising from the prospect of a patent to the decreased diffusion 
of the invention because of the exclusionary power of a patent. Proponents argue that this trade-
off should be implemented on a case-by-case basis via the nonobviousness standard of § 103. 
They could argue that the subject matter boundary seems like a poor alternative policy 
instrument because the trade-off is made for a class of inventions rather than a specific 
invention. I would respond by claiming that cost savings justify exclusion of business methods 
§ 101 because a proper nonobviousness analysis (based on the economic trade-off) would deny 
patents to most business method inventions. The scope of patent rights can be analyzed from 
other perspectives. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for 
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (arguing that patent policy should 
be guided by concerns about commercializing technology). 
 133. Trade secret protection is unlikely because marketing methods, product features, and 
product varieties cannot be kept secret. Trademark and copyright law offer some protection to 
customer service methods. Recently, we learned that trademark law can be used to protect a 
method of selling Mexican food. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 
(1992). Copyright also offers limited protection to business methods. See Rinaldo Del Gallo, 
III, Are “Methods of Doing Business” Finally Out of Business as a Statutory Rejection?, 38 
IDEA 403, 405 (1998). But see Stern, supra note 66, at 112-16 (discussing the limitations of 
copyright protection for business methods). 
 134. Trade secrets cannot be used to exclude competitors or slow cumulative innovation or 
diffusion because independent invention is allowed under trade secret law. Trade secrets do 
generate significant litigation and they lack the disclosure feature of patent law. 
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allows full patentability of customer service methods, but even a 
narrow reading allows patents protecting financial securities like 
Signature’s invention. 
Even if State Street is reversed there will still be some degree of 
patent protection available to business methods. The reason is that 
some methods useful in business have applications in technical fields 
as well. Some older business methods applications that were claimed 
as software perished on subject matter grounds because they were 
viewed as too abstract; but others escaped rejection on subject matter 
grounds. A prominent example is the linear programming algorithm 
invented by Karmarkar and patented by AT&T. This sort of 
algorithm has engineering applications, but its most profitable 
application for AT&T has been to management problems.135 The 
engineering applications of the Karmarkar algorithm leave no doubt 
about patentability.  
Expanded patent protection does not matter if firms choose trade 
secret protection in preference to patents.136 This option is most likely 
for administrative method inventions.137 Many of these methods are 
easy to keep secret and have a limited number of potential 
customers.138 These same characteristics make patents hard to 
enforce.139 Trade secret protection is also preferable for firms who are 
 
 135. AT&T sold software containing the algorithm at about $1 million per copy to airlines 
that use it for scheduling flights. U.S. Patent No. 4,744,028 (issued May 10, 1988); see 
generally Mark Paley, The Karmarkar Patent: Why Congress Should “Open The Door” to 
Algorithms as Patentable Subject Matter, COMPUTER L. REP., Sept. 1995, at 7. 
 136. Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and Should Patent Law 
Play?, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9 (1999) (discussing the importance of trade secret protection of 
business methods). 
 137. Dell and Walmart both owe their success to innovative distribution and marketing. 
Dell relies mostly on patent protection of its business methods while Walmart relies on trade 
secret protection. See Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual 
Property, 78 HARV. BUS. REV. 54, 57 (2000). Firms have the strongest incentive to patent 
administrative methods that are broadly applicable. Relevant examples include just-in-time 
inventory, scheduling techniques, quality circles, the M-form of corporate organization, or the 
hub-and-spoke air delivery system pioneered by Fed Ex. 
 138. Often these methods are tailored specifically to a particular corporation; they are 
tailored to reflect that corporation’s culture. Because the inventor is a manager in the 
corporation that is apt to be the only customer for the method, there is little reason to obtain a 
patent. 
 139. Infringement is especially difficult to detect when the infringing manager practices the 
method in her head. In the early days of software patents, commentators recognized a mental 
steps doctrine that would block software claims that are so abstract that they can be infringed by 
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concerned about imitation by competitors outside of the United States 
since business methods are not patentable elsewhere.140 The 
disclosure from the patent application would disseminate the 
invention to foreign users. Furthermore, fear of nonobviousness 
invalidation might encourage trade secret protection. Secret prior art 
and a vast body of poorly catalogued prior art might make inventors 
worry about validity attacks based on prior art unavailable to the 
examiner. One more factor favors trade secrecy. The first inventor 
defense reduces the risk to trade secret owners that a later inventor 
will sue them as infringers.141 Expanding the scope of this defense to 
include any prior user is a desirable, if indirect, way to minimize the 
number of business method patents.142 
It is possible but unlikely that future floods of business method 
patents will be avoided by rigorous screening via the nonobviousness 
standard.143 Section 103 has not presented much of a barrier in the 
 
thought. 
 140. See President of the European Patent Office, Examination of “business method” 
applications, at www.uspto.gov/web/tws/appendix6.pdf (May 19, 2000). 
Methods of doing business are, according to Article 52(2) EPC, not to be considered to 
be inventions. Although not explicitly stated, this exclusion is also considered to apply 
to a wide range of subject-matters which, while not literally methods of doing 
business, share the same quality of being concerned more with interpersonal, societal 
and financial relationships, than with the stuff of engineering—thus for example, 
valuation of assets, advertising, teaching, choosing among candidates for a job, etc. 
The term “business methods” has become a generally used shorthand for all of these 
areas. 
Id. 
 141. The “First Inventor Defense Act of 1999” Subtitle C provides a defense against 
charges of patent infringement for a party who had, in good faith, actually reduced the subject 
matter to practice at least one year before the effective filing date of the patent, and 
commercially used the subject matter before the effective filing date. The defense is limited to 
methods of “doing or conducting business.” Section 273 creates a new “First Inventor 
Defense.” The defense is available against business method claims if the defendant acted in 
good faith and reduced to practice the claimed invention more than one year before the effective 
filing date of such patent, and commercially used the invention before the filing date. 
 142. See Dreyfuss, supra note 89, at 272 (noting the limited scope of first inventor 
defense); see also AIPLA White Paper, Patenting Business Methods, at www.aipla.org/html/ 
whitepaper2.html (Nov. 27, 2000) (opposing special treatment of business method patents). 
 143. See Grusd, supra note 136, at 9 (“Unlike most commentators, the author will argue 
that the State Street holding does not necessarily lower the standard for obtaining patents on 
business methods. The State Street holding merely shifts the patent inquiry away from the 35 
U.S.C. § 101 subject matter analysis to the novelty, utility, nonobviousness, and specification 
inquiries.”). 
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PTO to persistent e-commerce patent applicants. Patent examiners 
find it difficult to reject applications on obvious inventions because 
they lack prior art they need to document their basis for rejection.144 
Weak patents still might be invalidated in court but much of the harm 
associated with patent floods is done when the PTO issues the 
patents.145  
However, the problem lies not just with application of the 
obviousness test in the PTO, the standard itself is too lenient (at least 
as applied to business method inventions).146 The increasing reliance 
on secondary considerations makes the obviousness hurdle too 
low.147 Especially troubling is the use of commercial success as an 
indicator of nonobviousness because the nexus between commercial 
success and a business method invention should be quite easy to 
establish. Another problematic aspect of obviousness doctrine is the 
requirement that the examiner must show that the prior art contains a 
suggestion to modify old methods. I suspect that many future 
business method inventions will consist of melding old business 
methods with new technologies, or updating old methods for new 
 
 144. Formulating and Communicating Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for Applications 
Directed to Computer-Implemented Business Method Inventions, at www.uspto.gov/web/ 
menu/busmethp/busmeth103rej.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2002). 
To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, 
there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in 
the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the 
reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable 
expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) 
must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. 
Id.; see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553-54 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (the dissent criticizes the 
majority’s reasoning and suggests a danger that music CDs are now patentable as a 
manufacture, because they are novel, and the PTO would not be able to show obviousness). 
 145. The Federal Circuit expressed skepticism about the nonobviousness of one of the first 
e-commerce patents litigated in Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., No. 00-1109, 
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2163, at *59-60 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2001) (“[S]ubstantial question of 
validity raised by the prior art references cited by BN and discussed herein.”). 
 146. See Amazon.com, No. 00-1109, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2163, at *44. There is not 
much chance that the Federal Circuit would adopt a more rigorous standard of nonobviousness 
for business method patent applications because it insists the standard of nonobviousness is 
invariant across fields of invention. 
 147. The district court in the Amazon case relied on secondary considerations to support its 
conclusion of nonobviousness. It mentioned copying of the invention by others and solution of 
a long-felt unmet need. Amazon.com, No. 00-1109, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2163, at *1366. 
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markets.148 John Kasdan illustrates this point by citing the 
Priceline.com patent on an Internet version of the reverse auction 
method that has been around for a long time.149 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I argue that the social cost of business method patents may be 
higher than other types of patents because of the problem of patent 
floods. Business method inventions are likely to cluster around the 
time that a new market opens. The cluster of inventions gives rise to a 
flood of patents. Patent floods create social costs that exceed the 
simple aggregate of the social costs associated with each patent in the 
flood. Those costs are attributable to increased licensing and 
litigation costs, an increased danger of anticompetitive exclusionary 
use of patents, and a stifling of refinement and application of the 
patented inventions.  
I am particularly troubled by patents on business methods that I 
call customer service methods. Customer service methods relate to 
marketing, product features, and product varieties. In comparison to 
administrative methods, customer service methods are likely to 
cluster around the time a new market opens, and thereby create flood 
problems. I fear that customer service methods are especially likely 
to create a patent thicket that slows cumulative innovation and 
 
 148. The PTO insists there is some bite to § 103 as applied to e-commerce patents. Recent 
guidelines are reassuring on the point that “merely providing an automatic means to replace a 
manual activity which accomplishes the same result is not sufficient to” satisfy § 103. See 
Formulating and Communicating Rejections under 35 U.S.C. 103 for Applications Directed to 
Computer-Implemented Business Method Inventions, at www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/ 
busmeth103rej.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2002) (citing In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95 (Pa. 
1958)). The guidelines also observe “The Internet, to one ordinarily skilled in the art, for some 
time now is recognized as a vehicle in which information is shared from computer to 
computer.” Id. These comments seem correct, but do not really address my concerns. See 
William M. Bulkeley, Fewer Patents on Methods Get Clearance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, 
at A3 (“Critics charge that many business methods being patented are simply computerizing 
activities that are obvious and have been done with paper and pencil in the past.”). See 
Dreyfuss, supra note 89, at 278-79 (warning the courts not to allow patents on well known 
business methods just because they have a software implementation). 
 149. See Kasdan, supra note 125, at 159 (speculating that the PTO “may not have found 
the Priceline.com patent . . . to be obvious because, following the directives of the Federal 
Circuit, they were unable to find anything in the literature suggesting that it might be a good 
idea to computerize such transactions”). 
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diffusion, and institutions like patent pools may not emerge to solve 
these problems because of the uncertain valuation of these inventions 
and the heterogeneity of the inventions and patent owners. Trade 
secret law rather than patent law will often protect administrative 
methods, so making them patentable subject matter might not have 
significant effects. 
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